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Wittgenstein and Communication Technology - A conversation 
between Richard Harper and Constantine Sandis 
 
Final author version - forthcoming in Philosophical Investigations, 2018 
 
CS: When Daniele Moyal-Sharrock had the idea that for the BWS's tenth anniversary we should talk about Wittgenstein 
in the 21st century we thought we need something on technology and what better than Richard Harper on information 
communication technology. Professor Richard Harper has led research groups at Xerox Europarc, as well as Microsoft 
Research in Cambridge for many years. He founded and directed the Digital world Research Centre at the University of 
Surrey. He is now the co-director for the Institute for Social Futures at Lancaster University. So maybe he could talk about 
the 22nd century as well! He is also a partner in Social Shaping Research which he may tell you about a little later, if you 
ask him. You are probably all asking what this has to do with Wittgenstein (or maybe not…) and so I thought I would 
begin by asking Richard how he ended up here. With this kind of background, what brings you to our Wittgenstein Society? 
Why are you here Richard? 
 
RH: As an undergraduate in the late Seventies, I did sociology, amongst other courses, at Manchester 
University and there we were introduced to Wittgenstein. His philosophy was viewed as an integral part 
of understanding social science.  Winch in particular was our mode of introduction to his philosophy - in 
his The Idea of a Social Science. There was a main course for every social scientist which was called Mind and 
Society taught by Professors Wes Sharrock and John Lee; some of you here have will have met them. They 
are sociologists and were interested in Wittgenstein and Winch for two or three reasons: one to do with 
the possibility that one would need to be careful in the categories used to explain things in the social 
sciences. The temptation in sociology particularly (as in all the social sciences)  is to be hijacked by 
categories and Wes and John taught us to be very sensitive to the need to be adroit in the use of 
categories – not just how you label social types but how you understand social actions, you know, the way 
you describe them, the categories that pertain. And they thought that particularly some of the arguments 
on the history of religion,  which was very pertinent to sociology,  which Wittgenstein had explored in 
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some of his work and which Winch also explored,  suggested that you need to be especially careful about 
explanation of human conduct when the thing about that conduct is, if you like, rather precise, rather 
particular idea, to do with a bunch of ideas, ideas with particular shapes and relations to action. Going to 
a church is not just something done for habit, it fosters a feeling in the body that allows a willingness to 
touch god, that was one of the examples of the sort of careful, precise set of relations to actions and ideas 
in society we were warned to look out for.  Wittgenstein’s remarks on the mind, mindfulness and ‘mind in 
action’, were very encouraging to sociologists, we were taught, because it suggested that perhaps mind can 
be thought of as a socially organised phenomena made relevant in action, or made irrelevant in social 
organisations, in such a way that some things about the mind became private, some other things public in 
socially demonstrative ways. Essentially the phenomenon, ‘the mind’, was something society arranged and 
was manifested in language use and that is social use. Language is society in this view, part of what makes 
it. Hence it could become a topic in sociology – mind and society.   
We were also taught that Winch offered the most explosive argument of all about social explanation and 
theory – in his claim that descriptions and explanations of human conduct could be - are - internal to one 
another. So, to properly describe an action is to describe it in terms which make sense to the parties 
involved (putting it simply), and this really begged the issue of what sociological explanation would 
become since hitherto – before Winch -  sociological explanation had been governed by the principle that 
sociologists know better than those they study, the hoy polloi, the geyser on the street, well women too. 
The people we were looking at were fools, in this traditional view, subject to ideological trappings and 
such. We sociologists were in ivory towers, on elegant seats and, through our judicious reading and our 
pre-Wittgensteinian philosophies, knew better than the hoy polloi. We could tell them how social 
structures governed their lives, what they thought, did.  But then what we found with Winch was 
someone saying perhaps we need to understand the hoy polloi from their own perspective; that 
understanding how they do their world would be in terms that’s relevant to them since it was those terms 
that gave that world its sense.  
Now this contagion of possibilities – this new view - was wonderfully encapsulated by an extremely 
difficult person and an extremely difficult sociological writer call Harold Garfinkel. Harold Garfinkel was 
not a Wittgenstein reader, in fact there is no evidence to suggest he ever deigned to lower himself to read 
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Wittgenstein. But what he did have was a genius to realise, in his own research in the 1950s and 1960s, 
that talk seems to be integral to action and to understand language categories in talk you needed to 
understand the action in question. This was emphatically what we were taught in Mind and Society. This is 
what we were taught Wittgenstein argued, though Wittgenstein wasn’t too interested in empirical topics, 
not sociological ones like Garfinkel.  In any case, if you want to understand the action in question, 
according to Garfinkel, then you need to understand the talk; the two went hand-in-hand.  And what that 
meant is that if you are going to do sociology, if you are going to do field work, say, like an 
anthropologist, don’t just go and look at the social structure as it were, don’t look at power, gender, 
organisation processes (leaving aside how you might do that), look at talk, loo at talk in the workplace say 
and then see how those things, like power, whatever, are manifest through talk. And through the talk in 
the things people do.  
Now that’s not the only way you can do in sociology.  Because even after Garfinkel, it still makes sense 
to, in sociology, ignore talk and you can, perfectly reasonably, treat the world as populated by agents who 
don’t tell their stories and look at the world that way. You know, various forms of statistical approaches 
don’t need talk to make interesting observations about social patterns – dynamics in income for example. 
Yes you can actually produce very interesting research that way but we were taught another view -  and 
that is to say, No, don’t do that, instead look at talk as part of the agency of those you are studying.  and 
that led me to do my PhD. I looked at chartered accountancy, at the work of auditors in a company called 
Arthur Anderson, gone now, of course, and what people talked about in their work. How talk was part of 
their work with numbers. Shall I say more about that?   
CS: Yes, why not. And maybe say something about doing things with Wittgenstein rather than commenting on 
Wittgenstein, which you alluded to with Garfinkel. And what that means. 
RH: Oh, okay, so listen. I have heard two or three really great talks today. One of the things about Peter 
Hacker’s talk this morning, is that he showed, which I showed in my PhD, and what I try to teach to my 
PhDs,  and undergraduates, about social organisation, about people interacting together,  is that when 
they talk, when they interact, when they do these things, that is to say when they talk,  they do it 
praxiologically, yes, in time, but they also do it collaboratively, they do it procedurally with each other, 
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they learn about how to do ‘talk things’ together. What I mean is, that talk is not just part of action, as 
Wittgenstein would say, but talk is done collaboratively, this sounds daft because it’s so obvious, but what 
I mean is that language use is essentially a sociological phenomenon, not a cognitive one, or even a 
philosophical one, not in the way I am meaning. Eh, what do I mean? So, even now, I can look in wonder 
at the still faces in front of me – here and now – and see that those still faces, the audience’s faces, are 
showing a willingness to listen to me. It’s very flattering. So my point is not that, the flattering, it's that  
we are doing this collaboratively, this lecture conversation thing, so that also happens when people do 
anything together, when they are talking, say, using language, they do it together, and if they are doing it 
together then one wants to go and look at how they do it together.  One doesn’t want to look at language 
use from one person’s point of view, you need to look at action with words as, em, joint action.   
CS: Aren't there any exceptions? 
RH: So let me get back on my thread.  I was thinking, earlier, why is this being presented to a group of 
Wittgensteinians as a possibility – you know that language is a joint enterprise? Surely they will have read 
Harold Garfinkel, surely they will have read ethnomethodological studies done in his name, which are all 
about the procedural arrangements of talk and language in action, about how the mind, for example, is 
made manifest in terms of talk, manifest in things people do together, in the dance of mums and babies 
and they way they sing to each other in their ums and arrs, in fathers and sons and how they challenge 
and mock, in those interactions which are praxiological though time. First this then that, in sequences of 
words. 
In my research that has often been the key topic that I have been interested in, given that’s how you 
should understand social action and how it’s organised, given that it has a procedural form, a 
collaborative affair in language,  given that you are disciplined by a desire not to be tempted by irrelevant 
categorisation, given that you are also disciplined by a desire not to allow mysterious categories to help 
explain things other than the categories that are intrinsic, internal to the setting, namely, talk, turns, chat, 
being together in words. 
So, then what do you come up with? I mean, if this is your view? Now what you come up with are often 
fairly sort of prosaic things. To run ahead, when I first went to work at Microsoft Research, they were 
	 5	
really keen on me helping them explore why people communicate. Because part of my career has been 
exploring how people communicate, writing books about how people communicate, writing a whole 
book, imagine, on why teenagers text, so, absolutely I was excited at that prospect, can you imagine going 
to a company with billions of dollars and say this is why people text? So I did a big presentation on 
communication, and this is, oh was, 10 – 15 years ago, and this was the topic. What I was trying to 
explain to the engineers then, in that presentation, was that there’s lots of reasons why people might 
communicate.  Sometimes it’s instructive communication. When you sit next to Constantine, for example, 
then you listen, you are going to be instructed by him. Sometimes, for another example, when you go out 
with a friend, for example my best friend Phil, he will talk at me and it’s not instructing, he’s just talking at 
me and I just listen. I am a bucket for him to poor words into. He doesn’t instruct me about anything. 
For me it is just a listening. But it’s different from what I do with Constantine. A listening can have 
different purposes. And so I said to the Microsoft engineers, the Outlook team, ‘What could the future of 
communication be? You could say that what you’ve done with Outlook is built a communications 
channel, which is like a vision of a cybernetic exchange, like Locke’s vision of communication, 
telementation. Stuff is in here, in the head of the user, and the email is used to send it, that stuff,  over 
there, to that person’s head.  An organisational actor over here has stuff that needs to go to an 
organisational actor over there’. And I said ‘Okay, if you have done that, is there some stuff you have 
missed? Other kinds of communications doings? And I suggested to them that one of the things you 
might say when you look at teenagers, when you look at them talking to each other. What do you see? ‘All 
of you in the Outlook team’, I said, ‘presumably are old enough to possibly have had kids, to see kids and 
to wonder, when kids are standing at street corners, what it is they say to each other? And if they are not 
at street corners they are sitting in the living room playing games, on-line games say - what is it they say to 
each other?’ I suggested to Microsoft Outlook team they just pause and think ‘What is it that teenage boys 
say to each other?’ And I paused, and I said, ‘Nothing, they are saying absolutely nothing’. Now the moral 
of that is not to be contemptuous of them and say what idiots we have produced! I was saying to the 
Outlook folks perhaps you might think of a communication technology that might allow nothing to be 
said. After all, that’s what these teenagers do, so why not support it?  
So what on earth would that be?  
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Take the possibility that when you send a message, all the purpose of the message is this (Richard slaps 
Constantine on his back gently): it says ‘Wake up, come on, look at me’. And then a reciprocation – 
Constantine does something back. Now the key property of that message – the one I have just done – is 
that, is not that it is content free, but something else: another property of that message is that once it 
done it doesn’t matter anymore, you don’t need an audit trail of slaps on the back saying notice me, notice 
me. Likewise with teenage boy’s talk - what you need is a vehicle for them to prod each other and prod 
each other back, just like I prodded Constantine. What you want to do is get a little economy of prodding 
which is what teenage boys do and if they don’t punch each other, as I just did with Constantine, they hit 
each other with words. The words have no meaning except the dance which is ‘notice me’, ‘notice me’. 
That’s the category that conveys, describes that type of communication.  
So I suggested to the Outlook folks that they might engineer a communications application for a mobile 
phone called ephemeral messaging. When you sent a message, the message can be ‘timed out’ so that it would 
disappear after, oh let's say, 30 seconds. It might have other properties like when it arrives on your mobile 
phone, this is the one that really upset them, the sender could choose the ring tone that announces its 
arrival. So instead of the receiver deciding how their phone rings, the sender chooses how it does and 
send that ring tone as part of the message - so when I send one to Constantine, it would be ‘Constantine, 
get off that book, get off that book, get off that book! Stop reading!’ or ‘Constantine, wake up! wake up!’ 
You could say really offensive things and I suggested that part of the fun of being able to do that might 
be that teenagers, for example, and youngsters more generally, would know they could use this 
communications thing to be offensive. But not really offensive, because it’s like the currency of their talk, 
it’s what’s playful to them and they know what is an appropriate thing to do. So they might just send a 
message for the silly sound the ring tone makes like ‘whoop-whoop-whoop’ because it will make them, 
the person they sent it to, snigger and giggle. It might embarrass the recipient because Mum and Dad are 
around, say. My point is that this might be a property of communication pattern, a dance, a turn talking 
when the turns didn’t do anything except make play. A turn a play. And I explained that this was 
pointless, in a sense, this kind of messaging. But that this was its character, how it needs to be 
understood, its value, what it was, the category of forms of communication relevant here.  
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I explained that engineering such an application it might be quite a complex thing to do because you 
would have to make it so that your phone would have to control over a remote phone. This is not what is 
normally inside the communications application, so here you would need to do something that is 
normally external to the communication application, namely, control the auditory function of the phone, 
and that kind of thing is normally handled in the operating system of the phone, of the remote phone, the 
one you are as it were calling with this messaging app. And the engineers laughed at me and they said 
‘Why would we want to do this? Surely we would want to teach teenagers to do Outlook, to document 
their communication through purposeful communication. Why would you want them to mess about?’   
And at that moment I wilted, and I thought, I’m not going anywhere at Microsoft. My attempt to convey 
what people do with communication with a subtle use of categories, where one use is to do playful, 
pointless messaging as a means of noticing each other, and a category that thus different from what you 
might call the category of functional messaging, the sort of thing done with an Outlook email, had not 
been understood. Or of it had, had not persuaded the engineers. This was not a category they wanted to 
honour with code. Of course, maybe my example was not right, I should not have offered such an 
extreme contrast. But I thought they might see how teenagers don’t do functional communication in their 
own families and so this might make sense to them. But it didn’t.    
That was my first big presentation. Five years later, Instagram messages are the common place that 
acknowledges this very category of being in touch. Be that as it may, what I’m trying to say here, is what I 
learnt and the discipline I was taught by Wittgenstein at Manchester, was to have the good grace to try 
and see what people are doing when they communicate, try and be in touch, and to learn what the 
perspicuous description of it would be. To understand, to look at boys with each other, and think, 
actually if you listen to them as a parent, what you see is just boys being together and it doesn’t matter if they 
are speaking Latin or whispering hoots or grunting like monkeys when they are there, what they are doing 
is being together. And then you can create opportunities – technological ones - for that form of being 
together might – like a playful, ephemeral messaging platform that would let them feel as if they are 
together even when they are apart.  
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CS: You basically described poking before, which later become a thing on Facebook…so I used to have a special ringtone for 
when my mother rang but then she rang me accidently when she was next to me and that wasn’t a good idea, so it can 
backfire.  
Audience: Are you going to share that with us? 
CS: I’m not going to tell you what it said. Okay, we’ve had discussions earlier today about the empirical versus the 
conceptual and describing conceptual truths and making empirical observations. Do you have views on how these two come 
together in your line of work? 
RH: When I was an undergraduate, like a lot of undergraduates, I was not really sure what I wanted to do.  
I was encouraged to do social science and social science sort of appealed, a bit more than philosophy 
because it seemed a bit more applied, but it really wasn’t that applied so when I had the chance to go to 
corporate life, to make, build, to engage with making things, that seemed appealing. So, when I had the 
chance, first of all, the first thing I did was phone my Dad because my Dad, who was an engineer, would 
say to me and indeed he did, ‘Oh, you will have a proper job then?’  He meant, though he didn’t say it, a 
proper job rather than being an academic and sociologist who just wrote about things. Also, he was 
enchanted by the possibility of making things.  
Now what’s this got to do with this question? Oh, what have I learnt, how the empirical and the 
conceptual come together? Well, what I learned in the business of spending 10 – 20 years in corporate 
life, when you are working with engineering, what happens is you come to learn that you can be really 
cack-handed with your account of the phenomena and your understanding of language – despite your 
training. And when I say cack-handed I mean to say the following: one of the things you have to worry 
about when you are working with a team of engineers is what motivates them. Now when I did my big 
presentation which failed to persuade the engineers that they should build ephemeral messaging, I didn’t 
really take seriously that if you get up on a Monday morning and you are coming in to spend five days 
doing some software engineering, then you need to have something that makes you think this is ‘not a 
really miserable job’ and what motivates you is that the aspiration you are doing something good and 
powerful. If you say to a bunch of engineers that are earning hundreds of thousands of dollars a year, 
‘Hey guys why don’t you come in and make an application that teenage boys can use and it’s going to 
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have no residue, no social benefit, it’s just going to let them play endlessly?’ they are going to look at you 
and think ‘Oh yeah, great. Go and get a small start-up company to do that, but I’m not doing that, I’m 
going to do something important’. And it’s not that they’re pompous, it’s that they are genuine and they 
are decent people who want to make a difference. One of the things you have to think about is what are 
the kinds of motivations that they have. They don’t admire teenage boys and their giggling talk, they want 
boys to grow up. So that colours their motivations, the engineer’s motivations. 
Let me give another example. One of the problems in the explorations of concepts and categories I have 
encountered has related to projects looking at memory and how you can replicate memory. Now the 
engineers in computer science that I have worked with on this, have imagined that human memory is like 
a machine memory. Now, you  might think of all the classic arguments of Wittgenstein, with arguments 
related to that made famous with the homunculus argument, and the distain that that philosopher has for 
the idea of memory as container, as a thing that is filled, which is pretty much what this computer science 
vision of memory is. But, okay, when you are working with engineers who are motivated to build 
something, if they have a vision that they can make a computational memory like a human memory,  then 
justifying the thing they can build on their computer by saying it like the ‘computer mind’ is what gets 
them going. It gets something built. And what do end up with?  You get a big, visual data processing 
database. That’s the kind of thing they build, a data base with images. So, so, that seems a like a long way 
from the concept of mind, sure, but it is something. It is a functioning machine.  And what it is also 
incredibly fast, it’s incredibly well indexed, you’ve got all kinds of relationships between these visual 
objects and ways you can string them together, and so it’s fantastic in lots of ways. In your view, it’s not 
‘the mind’ or whatever that might be, not a thing, but what it is, is a doing, yes?  It is a really interesting 
machine they have built that does interesting things. They wouldn’t have built it if they didn’t think that what 
they were building was just like the human mind.  
So what I have learnt is if I had said to them beforehand, ‘No, this is not how the mind works, you 
should not use that metaphor; you should think of the memory as a verb, as a place you visit, as a place 
that you assemble, a place that you make relevant in chit-chat and talk. And further that you judge 
people’s powers of social competence by the way they invoke the past not by their objective truth with 
which they go to the past, they will say, (the engineers) ‘I don’t know what you are talking about, Richard’. 
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They have concepts which let them act and those concepts let them act are, I think, the right concepts for 
the work they are doing – the work of engineering.  
The problem for people like me is saying ‘okay, when is the moment when those right concepts are no 
longer right for the job at hand, which is at the moment when they have built something and when we 
need to start thinking about interfaces for it’.  So you then ask ‘How might you use these sorts of data 
stores?’  
If you use such a system,  let’s take a thing called Sensecam  - a wearable automatic camera device that 
could take thousands of pictures at various frequencies during the day like a visual memory prosthesis. A 
standard conception related to this device, one related version, was that you just need to remember a 
moment, say, when I first met Constantine this morning, and this device, this Sensecam, would have 
indexed that little moment and you could retrieve images for that moment.  We suggested, and tried to 
persuade the engineers, that that wasn’t quite the right way to treat Sensecam. It begged questions about 
what indexing would mean here. Surely a person would need to know what it is they are looking for if 
they were to find it on Sensecam, so, it was like, we are not sure Sensecam can do anything for you except 
be a resource. A resource for what? It is not a memory. It’s a data store. So what you needed to do is 
allow that database to be something that you might visit and use as a kind of resource to bring ‘the past’, 
pictures of the past, into talk,  or, let’s us say,  when you are sending messages. You marshal it to make 
available images when you need them. Or, perhaps, for another possibility, you could use Sensecam data 
to construct little ‘days in your life’, a series of pictures brought together like a cartoon, or so that you 
would send to your partner as artful renderings, as a kind of poetry made of visual lyrics, as it were, of 
your circumstances – a writing in pictures. And we proposed that you would have an interface for that 
creativeness and we would need to devise that.  
The point is that one would be at a moment when you wanted the engineers to move towards thinking 
about these purposes and novel interface ideas that it would be at that point that we needed to start 
persuading them that perhaps, then, at that moment, their psychologistic kind of Turin Theoretic notion 
of memory was no longer applicable.  
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So, what I am saying is that I have learned over the years is that it is best to be careful about the 
applicability of categories and concepts. One needs to let them do various kinds of work.  Rather than 
saying this concept is wrong here, one needs to accept that some concepts can be right in all sorts of 
strange and interesting places if you understand what right means there and then.  
And I hate to say that one of the things I have noticed over the years is that those trained in philosophy 
can have a tendency to elevate their powers of control over categories, as if they have a kind of an 
imperial role across everyday life so that they adjudicate the meaning of categories. In my view, this is not 
as Wittgenstein tried to encourage us to see categories as diverse, and to understood in use, but goes 
against it somehow – it seems to imply that categories should be systematic and tidy, imperial, and 
philosophers can adjudicate about this role.  
Well, actually, lots of categories, when they get tied down into moments of action, into different places, 
do really particular things. From afar, philosophers can look at categories and complain that they should 
not be used in some way, but they don’t know how that works, that use of a category, in that place, but if 
you understand them in action, in that place, you can see the credit that use might have. This doesn’t 
mean you don’t also need to show some finesse when their moments of change might occur, when 
somethings being built on a basis of a motivation related to one category turns into something else which 
you then need to redesign around a different category.  
But my footing, as it were, in Wittgenstein, has given me the courage to say, allow the action to speak, that’s 
what you should be thinking about, what are you trying to do next? – that’s what you should ask. And 
once, if you can be clear about that, then you can appropriate the right set of categories to help you get 
there – to that next. And this can mean you lose some on the way, change which ones you are orienting 
to, which categories pertain.  
CS: I remember when I first came to visit you at Microsoft, thinking why on earth is this guy interested in me, and I walked 
into your office and saw Malcolm’s Memory and Mind and some of Peter Hacker's books and then the penny dropped, but I 
want to ask you, did you convince Microsoft? So this kind of argument… look if you think that communication is all about 
exchanging information for functional purposes then you are going to sort of limit the kind of software or devices you build, 
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and teenagers - or whomever -  might want communicate for all sorts of reasons that don’t fit the Lockean model. Are they 
kind of getting convinced of this sort of thing now? You mentioned Instagram. 
RH. Well, not always. I’ve got patents for key aspects of what Instagram does. So that is good, but no, we 
didn’t make that product.  In the kind of research life I have had, you get used to - as do those of you 
who are sturdy academics -  you get to know that it’s not necessarily whether your arguments are right or 
whether the paper you have written is perfect, it’s not necessarily always whether it gets published that 
matters, but you stick with your arguments, you keep putting them forward, you don’t give up. You do 
things for faith, in faith that it is n the right direction even if it doesn’t always get noticed.  
I have singularly failed to influence Microsoft on its communications models despite the fact I go to a 
Head Office of a company which makes billions and offer them what I think are ways forward, ways that 
I think my research shows opportunities will be found in. One of my best moments was when I went to 
the head office of Outlook, the engineering team, and in their brainstorming room, what they call – they 
had a fantastic Californian name for it – Skunk Works Room, that was it - they had pictures of this 
magazine I had written all over the walls, a magazine on why people communicate and every example of 
why they communicated taken from that magazine that was on their wall – pinned up there - was not 
about functional exchange of information. It was about every other thing you might do!  And they had it 
up there as their blueprints for the future! Including my ephemeral messaging concepts! None of those 
ideas ever showed up on a product. But I was gratified they were thinking about them, well I assumed 
they were. My ideas got to the reviewing table.   
But there are other examples where I do think I might have influenced technologies more successfully. 
Some of which everyone in this room will have used, I would think, I can think of something that I 
helped evolve but in some of these cases I don’t have any credit for. I am not complaining about this, this 
lack of credit, because good ideas - and I’m not saying mine are always good ideas - but rather, many of 
the ideas I toy with are common currency. Good ideas are often common ideas. So, in the case I am 
thinking of now, we were trying to persuade Bing that the problem with the search engine user experience 
was that it is conceived on the basis that the human user as merely an information seeker, like a computer 
trying to find a piece of target data, and so the systems are optimized around getting an answer to a 
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question, data for the question, as quickly as possible and the experience of using a search engine reflects 
that, the user interface and such.  
Indeed, that model was used for search engines at first; indeed one might say that was actually what those 
early users were doing. It really was a mixture of FBI agents and engineers in Palo Alto trying to find key 
pieces of information as quickly as possible. So, the model of the information forager was right at that 
time. But we tried to persuade Bing that if you looked at people searching today, years after the first 
search engines were built, say when search engines are being used now, today, on a Saturday morning for 
example, at home, what you would find is that the users seem to be doing something else. Not the same 
thing as these early models assumed. People seem to be using a search engine to pass the time of day. So, as a 
measure of this, there doesn’t seem to be much logical connection between one search and another 
search.   
When we talked to people who were using search engines on Saturday mornings, one of the things that 
they said to us about this strange voyaging, is they were just playing on a search engine and having fantasies 
about holidays, fantasies about sports cars or, at my age, a fantasy is about motorbikes I suppose. And 
then they said ‘I wish you could keep that somehow and make you know, links.’ So we came up with the 
idea that when you did a search you wouldn’t just have the kind of URLs or SERPS (Search Enquiry 
Results Page) as they are called, but you might do something else, which is create what we call a Card.  
Some of you will be old enough to know what a cigarette card is, some of you, if you are North 
American, will know what a baseball card is. It’s like Constantine’s notebook with a picture at the top and 
some text. So we came up with the idea that when you do a search, the search engine would find websites 
that seem most likely to provide what you are looking for, but also go through those websites, take what 
seems to be the most likely picture and the most likely text from them for your search query, and create a 
card and present that card on the right of the search, like a little Wikipedia entry for that particular search, 
as the answer to your search.  
And we suggested that you could consolidate that, those cards, bring them together and keep them and 
people could drag them onto their desktop (from their browser) or they could send them as an 
attachment in an email.  
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So, to put this another way, a user would do a search and make a little content, a little card in their search, 
so it would be a picture of, say, Peter, and some text from a website that has been scraped about Peter, 
and the card they had produced would be unique, an output of their search. And if they quite like that 
card, they could say ‘Look, I want to send it to a friend of something’.  
And we said we can do this! I mean, we said to ourselves we could make this application.  
 So, we did a big presentation in San Francisco to the Bing team and before we went there we got lots of 
patents and working prototypes and things to make our ideas seem real and profound. Anyway, we did 
the presentation and there was absolutely total silence, it was very weird. I mean, absolute total silence. 
No-one said anything. And we were rushed out of the meeting room ten minutes after our slot. And this 
presentation was to the head executive of Bing who is now the director of Microsoft research. Okay, we 
thought, they didn’t like the idea, he didn’t like the idea, that’s why the silence. But three months later 
Google came up with the same thing, as did Bing; exactly the same thing! Cards!  So we came to think that 
maybe they had been thinking just as we had at just the same time. The silence was actually an affirmation 
of our idea, but they didn’t want to tell us.  
At that time, for us, we did not know that. That our idea was on the mark. One of the reasons we got 
silence, we thought, we thought at the time, is that when we proposed these cards, some of these cards 
wouldn’t select the best picture of Peter [Hacker] or the best text of his or Constantine’s works. There 
would be errors. And we assumed that the search engine people don’t do errors, they are in the business 
of 100% perfection and so our error rates was not acceptable to them. And that was the reason why it 
was wrong, that was what we thought, that is why the silence, since we were proposing something that 
was not on their path to the holy grail – perfect content, perfect answers to search queries. That is how 
we walked away from that presentation.  But, obviously, we were wrong. The search people don’t mind 
errors, if they think they user doesn’t mind, or is doing something else, if the category of doings is not like the 
information forager model but is something else, like journeying or gathering, card collecting, in this case.  
So, today, if you put in my name in any search engine you will get a slightly random picture of me and 
some text scrappings - lots of good examples one can find - but anyway there will be a card on the right 
of your SERPs page. You might not know it is called a card, but that is what it gets called. That card is 
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slightly lashed together, it’s not perfect and might have some wrong text or the wrong picture, the wrong 
Richard, but people like cards. Mostly they are good enough, they do the trick.  Millions of them are 
produced everyday!  
So, you know, I have had success and the trick about this was to try and suggest to engineers you might 
make them think differently about the uses and the grammar of action, the grammars related to categories 
of doings, searchings say, time-usings, gatherings, things you can do with search. Is this what you wanted 
to hear? 
CS: It's what everybody wanted to hear. Just before we open up to questions we have a few more minutes I wanted to hear 
some things about meaning and understanding as well. Possibly in relation to AI. 
RH: My last big job, just when I met with Constantine, was working with the speech engine folks at 
Microsoft, working on smart systems like Cortana and things like that. And this is illustrative of a number 
of things I have already mentioned. The speech engineers were completely enchanted by the possibility 
that you could build a speech engine which is 95% more accurate in terms of reasonable interpretation to 
an utterance of a user. And on that basis, they felt like saying we could change how people use machines 
and their aspiration was to maximise the accuracy of utterance recognition and, on that basis, maximise 
the sort of response that machine provided. Having done that they said surely a person would then be 
understood by the machine and then a person be able to understand the machine so then you could have 
a conversation between a person and a machine.  
And we said to them no, no, no, no, we understand the motivation you have got which is to be able to 
talk, use this to be able to talk to machines, that’s a simple motivation, a kind of categorical criterion that 
you can use to say how can we pass this? People can use any utterance, more or less, and the machine will 
come up with some sensible response. That’s not the same as saying, it’s a different category to say, that 
people have a conversation with a machine.  
Firstly, we said, or rather we tried to persuade them, what would a machine say to a user that would make 
for conversation? If the machine, if I’d asked the machine to find Constantine, and where he is, if the 
machine were to say ‘Here is Constantine’, would one call that a conversation? Well, it is certainly a verbal 
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command and respond cycle, but a conversation? Isn’t that about something else, interiority, perhaps, 
sharings about inner thoughts?  Isn’t that what one might say is a conversation?  
In that case, if a machine entered into a conversation, and sticking with the same example, would it say, 
conversationally, ‘I used this probablistic technique, combined with this proportion of your prior search 
query cache, combined with this geographical location, to identify the kind of information you want – 
namely, where is Constantine.’ Is that the interiority of the machine that would make for conversation?   
When we doubted that this would make for a very good conversation, the engineers got very vexed and 
said no, no! So we responded and asked them to take seriously what would conversation with a machine 
be about?  What is it you are trying to achieve if have a conversation? We asked whether they were 
misappropriating the term conversation when really all you have, what you’ve got with things like 
Cortana, is a speech dialog system. An input-output procedure.  And if the speech dialog system works, 
surely you would need to understand why people want to speak to a machine, what benefits them from 
doing so, why they prefer sometimes to speak to a machine and sometimes prefer that a machine speak 
back, so to say. What the input output is for.  
We asked, what would be the situations of use in which that desire would be applicable? That dialogue?  
If they elevated their aspirations into something which sounds like the question of understanding, which 
is often what is being implied when the term conversation is used (its grammar if you like), we said that it 
becomes a different sort of thing.  
What we did try and persuade them to accept, and Constantine and I working on a paper on this, was 
look at how understanding makes sense in certain places, is a sensible purpose, and yet in other places, or 
doings if you like, understanding has a more profound sense. It is also sometimes a word that labels 
something that can be subtle. It is one of those wonderful categories where you can use it as a label to 
point towards the evanescent – somehow the opposite of understanding.  So, for example, when I speak 
to, if I were to speak to my hoover, I hope it will understand what I mean when I say ‘Can you hoover 
my carpet?’ When I say to one of my teenage boys ‘Does he understand what it feels like to be a vexed 
father?’,  I don’t expect my teenager to say yes or no. I am saying something about the relationship, I am 
using the word ‘understand’ differently.  But if that example is saying anything for the engineers using 
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speech systems, it is saying they have a need to make a taxonomy of those tasks where the understanding 
which is produced between an interaction and a user and a machine is the kind of interaction where the 
understanding that’s required is achievable by the machine and desirable on the part of the user. Does the 
user, do I say, want to find that my hoover is like Oliver, my middle boy, who yesterday morning was so 
hungover that he didn’t know what house he was in? I don’t want my machines to be giving me 
unnecessary interiority, I don’t want to understand in that sense. I genuinely don’t want to know my 
hoover is hungover.  
So you need to come up with a set of criteria for distinguishing where the meaning of understanding is 
understandable and applicable and those places where understanding is one of those phrases which label 
the fantastic, awesome, wonderful richness of human endeavour.  When I say things like ‘Do I want to 
understand what my wife was thinking when I came down here on a Sunday morning to a Wittgenstein 
conference?’ Probably not. My point is some words, some categories, are very powerful, very useful but 
you need to be careful with them and in my business, my career, navigating doings with words, 
conceptual analysis with words, and trying to get things done is, has been like a handicap race which I 
have fallen over lots of times but it has been great pleasure to compete in. Understanding is one of the 
words I have tangled with, as is communication and the phrase ‘being in touch’. 
CS: Thanks so much Richard, that’s really wonderful. We have time for some questions if anyone has anything they want to 
ask. 
Q: Have you had any experience with engineers trying to produce intelligent machines, or anything like intelligent machines 
like intelligence cars and the problems that might pose?  
RH: Yes, though one problem here is many different types of what an intelligent machine could be, so 
one of the things you might say about intelligent cars is that what the car is doing is behaving like a train 
and one of the things you might say about a train is that it is a wrought iron solution to intelligence 
because the tracks dictates where it goes. Now the problem with the car is that it’s evolved in a situation 
where there is choice. The reason why we are going away from a situation now, where there is choice, to a 
situation where there will be less choice. Traffic volumes means that there are fewer choices to make. We 
have to drive in train-like caravans. So, when it comes to intelligent cars, it seems to me better to think of 
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them like trains. So in my mind intelligent cars are not very intelligent. That they use a lot of AI to make 
probalistic techniques judgements about proximities, trajectories and routes, yes, okay but to me that’s 
not hugely interesting. It’s just a mere engineering problem.  
There are lots of other ways to use intelligent systems where the meaning seems more appropriate, closer 
to the everyday meaning of intelligence. Let me give you an example of the kind of complexities though. 
For many years, search engineers thought that the problem their technologies solved would be, would 
come to be, solved by AI. That is, that they would come to use AI to predict what the users wanted and 
to have targets available to respond to those wants. A user wants to search for this, and the search engine 
delivers it.  The answer. Yet when mobile phones took off and, in particular, when mobile phones were 
internet enabled and searches on mobile phones started being made, it made a complete mockery of the 
role of AI in search because it turns out that where you are on your mobile phone is massively 
determinate of what you are searching for. So, if I am looking for a Katja [Behrens], say, where I am 
determines which Katja I am interested in. The one I am after is almost certainly the one who lives 
nearby. Not one who lives in Alaska.  Massively. My cache, my historical record of use, the history of my 
prior searches, other determinations of what I might be looking for, all of which might use probabilistic 
AI techniques to come up with an answer to which Katja I am after, might be relevant but nearly always 
not as relevant as where I am. So, the hope that AI would help search engines better determine what 
answers I need is not as great as thought. It turns out where you are is more important. And that doesn’t 
sound like information that requires intelligence to know. It is just a geographic coordinate.   
 So how our AI unfolds is much more complicated than would seem.  As it happens, this Wednesday I 
have a meeting with Microsoft operating company that might have a big problem with AI, which is that 
they have clients who imagine that AI is going to solve lots of problems and they have machine learners 
from the labs who say they have solved everything and the two do not meet in any regards whatsoever 
because one of the problems the clients have is they imagine you can make data of things there are no 
possible ways of making data of them. So I will give an example. Some large retail companies want to 
know if you can use vision techniques to identify from a person’s face what they want when they walk 
into a shop. You get machine learners that say we can read moods so they put those two together. The 
big companies and the machine learners must be able to do this and, in the middle, you have people 
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trying to make a business out of it and they asked me to say ‘Richard can you come along and help us 
disentangle this terrible mess?’ Because there is no way this is going to be solved and part of the problem 
here is the expectations of people around AI is grotesque and has become hyperbolic and often it turns 
around really detailed possibilities and detailed possibilities which need to be thought through properly 
and a nice example is this one, whether visual processing machines can identify intention from the shapes 
of faces and the movements we call in everyday language expressions. But in a shop, all the camera sees 
when it captures a signal of someone standing still is not a person, but a still creature, it’s not a lingering 
creature; to linger is an implication about purpose. It is incarnate in action, in how we understand people 
but it is not visible in what a camera sees. But this is what the shops are interested in - how do you 
recognise that some person’s movement is a lingering? If so, why are they lingering, what is it saying 
about them? Can you recognise that the creature has stopped moving because they have seen something 
on the shelves? Or because a purchase has been brought to mind, to their mind, by the placement of 
goods in the entrance to the shop and so they pause, they linger? And that’s a big achievement for vision 
systems because, when the creature stops moving, it’s not necessarily visible what they are about. Visible 
here means two things – as in things seen and things seen as actions in the Winchean sense, as 
purposeful, as understood in terms of a concept of action. A vision system cannot distil the difference 
between a lingering which is pointless and one that is purposive – a pause to prepare for a purchase. 
Q: Ok, I agree that there’s a lot of fun in this area, there’s a lot of natural and good fun in this area, but I cannot deny the 
fact that I am very troubled that this is sounding as if it’s an ethics free zone. Technology is reaching a point where there’s 
virtually no limit to what we can create to meet a demand or a requirement or wish or a desire of a market who will pay 
money for it. That leads to the question -  and it’s seems to me to be a very genuine, real ethical and cultural question - where 
there are no such limits, how do we decide, should we simply make anything, everything because we can? Should we make 
anything and everything because someone we’ve seen is willing to buy it? This seems to me to be a serious question which is 
having a cultural impact. Many of the things you have mentioned, I mean my first reaction when you said about the fact of 
what had happened, was at last I have found out whose fault it was. 
RH: I wholly agree with that. What one learns from ready say, Wittgenstein, is about the delicate and 
diverse issues that are say articulated through different forms of expression and likewise with technology: 
it’s not to be thought of in terms of ethics in a carte blanche way. There’s all sorts of different sets of 
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possibilities and issues and different sets of ways of making ethical choices which are effectively bound up 
with the particularities of some kind of engineered, technologically-enabled possibility.  
So, with that as a background let me answer your question this way. When I first made this presentation 
about being able to control the remote phone I said to them, the engineers, I can show you how 
interruption in talk is a recognisable phenomenon. And I can show you as well that people respond to an 
interruption by noting it is an interruption and deal with it accordingly. They manage that unethical 
conduct, if you like.  Further, I can also show you that sometimes people will allow interruptions because 
some things deserve to be interrupted – sometimes interruptions are ok. Now, by the same token, given 
this, I suggested that an ethics of interaction would emerge with a communication channel in which one 
could manipulate my recipient’s messaging device in a way that seemed unethical, through interruption 
say. So, I would sometimes wind up a friend by calling at inappropriate times, by interrupting them, but I 
would, over time, come to settle into a pattern where most often the regime of behaviour would be 
subject to propriety – my friend would allow a little interruption, I would create some. It would not just 
be me, either, sometimes my friend would impose controls on me, like deleting my messaging rights if I 
interrupted too much and this would affect me. I would have to renegotiate comms. rights.  We would 
eventually come to a settled pattern if you like, an ethical way of handling the borders of communications 
ethics together.  Of course, interruptions seem a long way from ethics, from, oh let us say, trolleology and 
the kinds of examples - risible in my view – used in that form of thinking about ethics. My point is that 
there are ways in which propriety and ethics can show themselves, all sorts of subtle ways, and if you 
wanted to tame the big technology companies the way to do that is not to approach them in the general, 
not through trolleology reasoning,  but approach them on specific sets of issues and specific solutions to 
do with, say communications, and the way forward is to show how ethical operations could be done and 
managed by the users: and these operations could be an outcome of good design, design that allows users 
to make propriety.  Managing interruptions depends on allowing interruptions, technologies of 
communication might allow that. 
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Q: Just on a similar kind of vein, one of the things that technology and AI tries to do is a lot of machine learning, tries to 
predict what I want and I wondered whether that was a value you thought would shift, will there be other values that’s will 
be more important later? It’s actually a problem for me that it does that. Not only are the predictions sometime quite 
incompetent, sometimes they are helpful but sometimes they’re not. But I don’t want it to, especially Google, I don’t want it to 
guess at what I’m looking for because that distorts my process so I then have to go through quite a lot of trouble to make sure 
it doesn’t do that. 
RH: No, exactly and here’s a good example of ethics, which is I think the ethical considerations 
sometimes need to be cut open and made a practical matter, something that a user, in my language, can 
act on and manage if you like, so that people can make different choices around what the technology can 
do.  So, for example, sometimes I don’t mind when the search engine uses my history and makes some 
predictions, that can make my search quicker. But, you know, sometimes other considerations come into 
play. Let me illustrate. We had a big project with Bing on ethics and search. It turns out that on Saturday 
morning there is very interesting user behaviour phenomenon that shows itself - because search engines 
are often emptied on Saturday mornings; the cache is removed, people reboot search engines, well not 
just the search engines, but the browsers too.  And Bing was convinced this was because people were 
doing porn on Saturday mornings and trying to hide their activities. That is why they deleted their search 
history. (That is what I mean by emptying the search engine. It’s putting it simply but it is pretty much 
what happens). And we did studies which showed virtually no-one was doing porn on Saturday mornings; 
they were shopping. And one of the things that they were doing was getting fed up with the predictive 
aspects of the systems leading them back to the same set of things to buy – boots, boots, boots! But we 
also found that sometimes they were genuinely wanting to hide what they were doing, their shopping; 
they wanted to hide it from their partner but not because it was porn. But because they were trying to buy 
a present for their partner!  
So, are there ethics here? Yes. But they are prosaic, in a sense. It is not big ethics here, but the ethics of 
buying presents and not being found out, and, related to that, there is the practical desire to get the search 
engine to work for me, and not constrain me by overly predicting what I am doing. When I shop, when 
anyone shops, one shops for this and then gets bored. Then one looks for something else it is hard to 
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predict when that happens. And, so, users end up having to show the search engine this by emptying its 
cache, so that a new session starts.  
So, is there, was an ethical muddle? Who is doing what here? The technologists, the search folks, or the 
user? There are lots of ways of figuring this out and moving forward, allowing a better dialog between the 
user and the system, and so forth, allowing what I just called better management.  I think the user should 
be heavily involved in this.  
But there are also these big arguments about, for example, the ethics of keeping personal data. This seems 
to me a different set of questions. Now one of the things you might say about the ethics of personal data 
is that it’s a great myth on the part of the search engine companies that the do anything with much of the 
data they collect. They genuinely can’t do anything with most of it because – well.  what you do with it?  
Aggregations of this data most often comes up with pretty bland implications. Someone who has just 
looked at a car is probably just about to look at a car again. That’s what you find. You don’t need rocket 
science for that, you don’t need state of the art AI to do that. Nor do you need cloud farms with billions 
of instances of the same; so it’s bizarre that the search engine companies and browser companies seek to 
gather all this user data. It’s just digital dirt.    
Q: Well this is possibly a question about those big data farms where they, as you point out, there is very little practical stuff 
that is got out of it and so going back to your question about concepts being right and wrong and your suggestion was that 
concepts that motivate engineers are just sort of fine so they just keep them turning over and producing this stuff and then at 
the end of the process we come along and adapt it and make it useful to us but giving it, applying a new category. But then 
there is this issue with well maybe the concepts that are motivating engineers have a kind of logic and destination and perhaps 
a religion of their own that are all heading in a certain direction and, as it were, trying to humanise the project at the end of 
the process might be, might not be a failsafe project. 
RH: Yes, I think that can be but I also think you are doing a kind of sociology of reasoning. 
Q: Well you’re a sociologist! 
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RH: Now hold on, let me finish. There is a tendency in sociological treatments of ‘reasoning’ that 
exaggerates the structure and scope of reasons. It’s a kind of craving, to put it in Wittgensteinian terms, 
this bigging-up reasons. For example, sociologists are particularly keen to give a kind of eschatological 
flavour to reasons; as if the reasons to do this here and now are related to the end of the world, as if 
reasons, ideas are al a schema. Think of Jameson, a cultural theorist but basically a sociologist. But in 
contrast, when I have worked with engineers very few link the ideas that motivate some product they are 
building with bigger, longer term goals. Their reasons are, well, more piecemeal.  You know, one of the 
things you might say about lots of scientists is that they have a philosophy of science and they are very 
keen to explore and understand what science might be and what it leads to – its big picture outcomes.  
The way these outcomes are described varies in different regimes of science, but the genera; tenor is 
common – think of the claims physics makes about the reality of the universe. You know the kind of 
scientism one comes across. But it is not likewise with most engineers. They have a very rough and ready 
view of reasons, and the categorisations to do with those reasons. Occasionally you will meet someone 
with a religious like edifice wrapping up their work – I want to make the world a better place with the 
digital, you know that sort of thing - but they are rare. Mostly what motivates them is, really, things like 
it’s Monday or it’s a Friday, and its crude and its simple, it’s almost violent in its symbolism in that they 
abide by the reasons they commit to but that’s all it is – I mean, their reasons are basically practical. 
Really, once they’ve done it, made whatever it is they are making, they have no, they don’t seem to be, I 
am saying this as a kind of anthropologist, they don’t seem to be wed to to the reasons that persuaded 
them to make that thing.  They are perfectly happy to be sold another set of accounts for that thing, that 
makes sense for them, that would get them out of bed on a Monday morning. They wont take any old 
view, though, I am not saying that. As I said, it’s just it’s difficult to come up with ones that they will buy, 
if you see what I mean. The issue here is really to do with  motivation,  what provides it, ensures it. 
Software engineering is a really miserable job. It’s incredibly difficult and you can spend weeks on an 
algorithm and if you are not totally convinced that algorithm is going to make a difference you are not 
going to do it. It really is, it’s not a simple problem, so having reasons for working on it is part of how 
you get work done. 
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But what I am saying is that this view, this view is always also somehow deeply practical. It’s not pious, 
it’s not part of some big system of ideas. I mean, I gave you an example of memory, how a notion of the 
mind having memory like a computer, was part of the motivational fabric that produced that wearable 
camera devices I spoke about, Sensecam. But the engineers didn’t think they were making claims about 
cognitive science, or reflecting some unified idea of what the mind was. All they thought was ‘That is a 
good idea. I could build that’.  And once they had done it they were very happy to let other people come 
along and say, let’s forget that memory thing and do this with Sensecam.  But they needed that idea to 
enchant them, to make them want to do it when doing it is, well, hard, a daily grind. Coding is work, after 
all, its not art. So you need vehicles to motivate you. Concepts. There you go. I would like to finish now. I 
have run out of words.    
